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UNITY, COINCIDENCE, AND CONFLICT IN THE VIRTUES' 
LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
There are many putative virtues, and they often appear to conflict: 
courage against prudence, love against fidelity. honesty against 
kindness, loyalty against common decency. Such conflicts raise 
questions about the coherence of the list of traits called vi rtues. And 
even when those traits coincide rather than conflict, as when both love 
and prudence recommend marriage. coherence is a problem because 
the question of motive is almost always significant: Are mixed motives 
acceptable in love, or must we strive for purity of heart? If the ideal is 
pure love, can prudence be a virtue at all in that part of our lives? 
Every account of the virtues raises such questions of coherence, and if 
any account is to be more than an annotated inventory of traits - ifit is 
to be a moral theory in any significant sense - then it must answer at 
least some of those questions. Historically, they have been framed as 
questions about the "unity" of the virtues, and I shall follow that 
tradition. But since my object is to examine the general prospects for 
coherence in virtue theory, I want to take an equally general view of the 
unity problem. 
Specifically, I shall assume that solutions to this problem can be of 
three general sorts, each of which may be described as an argument for 
the unity of the virtues.' (I) One of these is to argue for the identity of 
the virtues: to argue that they are, at bottom, all the very same thing - a 
perfectly seamless whole in which there are ultimately no separate 
elements, and hence no conflicts or overlaps. The classic version of this 
sort of argument is implicitly Socrates', in Plato's Prolagoras. 2 (2) A 
second sort of proposal is to argue for the organic unity of the virtues: to 
argue that they are all mutually compatible and connected parts of a 
whole - a perfectly harmonious whole in which, though there are 
genuinely distinct elements, there are no genuine conflicts} (3) And a 
third strategy is to argue for the ordinal unity of the virtues: to argue 
that they are a perfectly ordered whole, unified in the sense that, given 
any conflict between trails , it will always be possible in theory to 
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determine which one is primary - which one is the "first virtue" in that 
circumstance. 4 
I will not consider, here, arguments for the identity of the virtues. The 
attempt to make sense of this idea has produced extraordinarily rich 
discussions, beginning with Plato and continuing at least through the 
Middle Ages. 5 But it seems clear enough now that all of these discussions 
lead definitively away from any interesting version of the identity 
thesis. 6 Specifically, it is agreed on all sides that many separate virtues 
are distinguishable, and to say that they are all simply distinct 
manifestations of the very same thing (say of practical wisdom or 
knowledge) does nothing to answer the coherence question, since it will 
immediately reappear as the question of how to resolve conflicts between 
the different manifestations. To reply that such conflicts will be resolved 
by practical wisdom in its conflict-resolution mode is not very helpful at 
all. 
What is helpful , however, is to explore the idea that there might be 
some underlying trait or traits that generate all of the virtues, or that 
connect and regulate them. This idea leads to various instructive 
accounts of organic and ordinal unity. and eventually (I believe) to a 
particular sort of ordinal account. 
My project in this paper is to argue for an ordinal account ofthe unity 
of the virtues in the following way: (I) by showing the importance of a 
neglected class of questions about coherence - questions I shall refer to 
as coincidence problems; (2) by organizing conventional accounts of 
the unity of the virtues in a perspicuous way, and showing that they fail 
to solve coincidence problems; and (3) by describing the sorts of ordinal 
accounts that are available, sketching the outlines of one organized 
around practical wisdom, and indicating how it would handle coherence 
questions of all sorts, including those of coincidence. 
COINCIDENCE PROBLEMS 
It is important to see that even if a virtue theory can eliminate conflicts 
between traits , a large class of difficult practical problems is very likely 
to remain: namely, the problems that arise when two or more traits give 
the same guidance for conduct, but when we think only one of the traits 
should be controlling. ("Yes of course I wanted you to keep the promise. 
But because you wanted to , not because it was your duty. '') 
I'll call these cases coincidence problems. Love and duty often 
coincide for practical purposes - as often, probably. as they conflict. 
And the same is true of prudence and duty. and prudence and love. An 
account of the unity of the virtues that solves all the conflict problems 
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but leaves these coincidence problems untouched is inadequate. Part of 
my agenda in this paper is to show that traditional accounts of the unity 
of the virtues are inadequate injust this way. To do this, however, I need 
to characterize coincidence problems a bit more fully ~ to show, for 
example, that they are not simply conflicts in disguise, and to show as 
well that they are pervasive enough to present a serious test for any 
account of the unity of the virtues. 
In general, coincidence problems arise for acts that are defined in 
part by specific motives - motives that are constitutive of a virtue, and 
which come from that virtue. To explain: 
Many acts are defined withoUi reference to a specific motive that is 
constitutive of a virtue. Obedience to law is an example. One can obey 
the law from a very wide range of motives, including sheer perversity 
(where perversity is defined as doing the opposite of what people 
expect). Perverse obedience to the law is still obedience. But many other 
acts are defined in terms of specific motives. Benevolence is an example. 
One cannot act benevolently out of a wide range of motives, but only 
from one motive - roughly, the desire to do good for others. That 
motive is what makes an act a genuinely benevolent one, and it is a 
motive constitutive of the virtue of benevolence. 
Now when an act is defined in part by reference to a specific motive, 
coming from a specific virtue, we can get the following sort of 
coincidence: Several virtues might prompt a person to do the same 
thing - say, give a gift. If the gift is given out of prudence, it will be a 
prudential gift; if given oul of benevolence, a benevolent one; and so 
forth. There is no conflict in this, but there is a problem for a theory of 
the virtues. The problem is to decide which motive, and therefore which 
virtue, should be the controlling one. And more generally, the problem 
is to find an account of the unity of the virtues that explains how one 
can be both prudent and benevolent in cases where there is coincidence 
rather than conflict. 
Such problems are pervasive. Noticing two general classes of them 
should make the point. Note first that prudence, in a reasonably just 
social order, is likely to coincide with virtually every other virtue at 
some point. That is , if social life is reasonably just, people will typically 
get what they deserve, and it will generally be prudent to do the things 
one ought to do - to do the fair thing, the generous thing, in short the 
virtuous thing. Second, note that the old conflicts between duty and 
inclination, and between duty and a concern for consequences, have 
their counterparts in these coincidence problems. If fidelity, love and 
benevolence all prompt me to be faithful, the problem is not one of 
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conflict but coincidence. I must decide not what to do but how to do it. 
And such problems are obviously numerous. 
Now it may be objected that these so-called coincidence problems are 
really just disguised conflicts. The point may be put this way: No two 
virtues can ever recommend the same act if they require different 
motives for it. Ifprudence recommends a prudent gift, and benevolence 
recommands a benevolent gift , their recommendations do not coincide 
but rather conflict. Presumably. then, any account of the unity of the 
virtues which solved conflicts would solve these purported coincidences 
as well. If all coincidences are disguised conflicts, there is no point in 
distinguishing the two sorts of problems here. 
This objection brings out a reply that illustrates the depth of 
coincidence problems. Assume a reasonably just, stable society (or 
institution, or relationship) in which frankly prudential gifts are 
regarded with contempt, and either refused or accepted without 
reciprocity. Genuinely benevolent gifts, however, are accepted warmly, 
reciprocated, and sustain valuable cooperative practices. What 
prudence recommends in such a setting is the cultivation of the virlue of 
benevolence, and hence the benevolent motive, rather than the 
simulation of it , or frankly prudential giving.' (Simulation will 
sometimes not be prudent, since in a just setting it will often be 
discovered and then will never be rewarded as fully as the real thing.) So 
prudence will recommend not only the same overt act as benevolence 
but the same motive as well, and the coincidence will be a real one. The 
problem will lie in the fact that in one case prudence is the ultimate 
ground for the benevolence and in the other case it is not. The account 
of the unity of the virtues should tell us whether prudence should be 
such a ground. As noted above, I divide the attempts to give a unitary 
account into three sorts, of which only arguments for organic unity and 
for ordinal unity are plausible. I turn first to the organic versions. 
ORGANIC UNITY 
The fundamental problem with all accounts of organic unity is that they 
seem doomed to be too general to yield concrete moral guidance, and 
unable to handle at all the question of which virtue should be the 
leading one in cases of coincidence. These difficulties will ultimately 
prompt me to turn to an ordinal account, but it is worth explaining in a 
bit more detail the motivation for and problems with organic unity 
views. 
Ideal Characler. Following Aristotle, virtue theorists have often 
begun by sketching a description of human nature, or human agency, or 
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human flourishing from which at least a schematic picture of ideal 
moral character can be drawn. And it is tempting to hope that 
definitions of the several virtues can then be carved out of the picture 
like Ihe pieces of ajig saw puzzle. Such pieces will by definilion fit back 
together to form a unified conception of virtue. The task is presumably 
analogous to the one of defining the best body-type for a certain sort of 
athlete. We start with an account of what the athlete must be able to do, 
and what sort of strength, speed, agility, flexibility, endurance and so 
forth are required to do it. We can then decide, roughly, what an ideal 
athlete of that sort will look like, feature by feature - how tall, how 
heavy. and the like - assuming, perhaps, that when all this is put back 
together we do not want a picture that looks like committee work. The 
idea here is that perhaps we can do something similar in the case of ideal 
moral character. 
But there is a notorious problem with this: the only plausible accounts 
of ideal character available (or ever likely to be available) are too 
schematic to yield the sort of definitions of particular virtues that tell us 
much, in detail, about how we are to resolve conflict and coincidence 
problems. Assume, for example, that we take the necessities for human 
flourishing as the guide for constructing a description ofideal character. 
The question, then, is this: Given the general limits of human nature 
and the human condition, what sort of human being would flourish best 
as a human being? The answers seems to be that many identifiable types 
are able to flourish equally well. And each type appears 10 have 
generosity, say, and courage and prudence of somewhat different sorts 
and amounts. So we will get no guidance at all, on such an account, for 
theoretical questions about conflicts and coincidences. Or rather, the 
best we will be able to do is to produce some feeble advice relative to 
each person: "Well, if you want to go on in roughly this way, then you'll 
need more courage than I've seen so far. But of course if you'd rather try 
a slighlly different way of life, which many people have pursued wilh 
success, then mOTe courage won't be needed. Just more discretion." 
This is enough to suggest that the attempt to get a unified account of 
the virtues from a highly schematic picture of ideal character will fail to 
solve the unity problem. And as long as humn nature is as protean as it 
is, and the human condition as various as it is, the prospect of having 
more than a schematic account is nil. 
Reciprocal interdependence. Another tack is to try to establish that 
the virtues - at least a few fundamental ones - are mutually 
interdependent, so much so that it is not possible to have anyone of 
them without having them all. This, in fact, is what a long line of 
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commentators have taken Socrates' position in the Pro/agoras to have 
been, and Aristotle held it explicitly. (See Nicomachean Ethics 1 145a.) 
Such a view is now commonly referred to as an equivalence thesis, and 
expressed as a set of biconditionals: One has the virtue of justice if and 
only if one also has the virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and all 
the others. 
This is an initially baffling position, since many pairs of virtues seem 
either mutually exclusive or thoroughly independent: wit and humility, 
humility and magnanimity, justice and mercy, chastity and conjugal 
fidelity. And then there is the question of explaining the equivalence. 
Even if the material biconditionals happen to be true, we need to 
understand why they are true. Accidental equivalence is not enough to 
establish that the virtues are a unity. 
Attempts to argue for the reciprocal interdependence of the virtues, 
then, tend to restrict their attention to a short list of fundamental 
virtues - say justice, wisdom, courage and temperance - and then to 
offer either causal or conceptual analyses of the connections between 
them. An example of an argument for a causal connection is the 
argument that all the virtues on the list have a common source - say, in 
the workings of practical intelligence over the course of normal human 
development. This is a plausible reading of Aristotle's contentions in 
Nicomachean Ethics 1144b-1145a. And if the list is restricted to the 
fundamental virtues (as Aristotle did not do), the argument is convincing 
enough. Anyone who has the necessary good sense, prudence, and 
intelligence to cope successfully with a reasonably full life - i.e. , has 
practical wisdom - is certainly going to develop traits that can be 
called courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. And it may even be 
plausible to suppose that those traits would all have to arise together, 
even though they might develop at different rates or to different degrees. 
Ifso, then it would follow that to have anyone ofthem would be to have 
all of them, and the biconditionals linking them would be true. But it 
does not follow from this sort of causal argument alone that the traits so 
generated would be free of conflicts and coincidences in a way that 
handles the coherence problem. To get that result - even for a restricted 
list of the virtues - we would need to add the sort of regulative 
principle discussed below. So the mere causal interdependence of the 
virtues is not enough. 
Similarly for attempts to trace conceptual connections, at least insofar 
as I understand them. Here the idea is to show that all the virtues are 
connected to one or more central, or focal, or nodal traits (and thus, 
"through" those traits, to each other). The fundamental virtues are 
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often candidates for this role, and the argument funs something like 
this: To possess a virtue is to have a given trait in the proper degree and 
manner. It is possible, for example, to be generous, or courageous, or 
prudent "to a fault," or in a way that is self-defeating. To have such 
inappropriate traits is not to have the virtues of generosity, courage, 
and so forth, but rather some closely related vices.8 Now if we look 
closely, the argument continues, we will see that the "proper degree and 
manner" for each trait is defined by reference to a central set of 
reciprocally interdependent traits - the fundamental virtues. So 
exercising the virtue of courage (that is, courage of the proper degree 
and manner) necessarily involves conduct that is not only courageous 
but also temperate, wise and just; the virtue of temperance similarly 
involves courage, wisdom and justice; and so on for wisdom and justice. 
Thus it is true, for those virtues at least that to have one is to have them 
all. Other traits , such as modesty or generosity may be connected to the 
central virtues, so that "'through" the central ones all the virtues are 
connected or unified. But the relationship between peripheral and 
central virtues is presumably not always biconditional. Having a 
peripheral virtue may always entail being courageous, then, and wise, 
just and temperate as well; but presumably it is possible to be temperate 
without being chaste. 
But the conceptual equivalence of the virtues leaves coherence 
problems untouched. If we accept the equivalence, all we know is that 
we cannot have one virtue without the other. That does nothing to 
insure against conflicts, for perhaps a conflict will simply mean that we 
can have neither one, or that the one we give priority to will simply 
damage but not eliminate the other. And it does nothing to insure 
against coincidences, ;ither. Again we seem drawn toward the idea of 
an underlying regulative principle that could coordinate things. 
Regulative Principles. So another line to take toward an organic view 
of unity is to try to develop the suggestion that all the virtues exhibit a 
regulative principle which effectively coordinates them. One obvious 
candidate is some version of an Aristotelian principle of moderation, 
derived from the observation that many of the virtues stand between 
disreputable extremes - courage, for example, being somewhere 
between cowardice and foolhardiness. And it may be that all of them 
involve a sort of prudence, or moderation, or sweet reasonableness that 
makes them self-adjusting in situations of potential conllict.9 This 
would certainly justify the label of organic unity, for it is analogous to 
the homeostatic mechanisms (e.g., with respect to respiration, body 
temperature, fluid balance) found in complex organisms. The thought 
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is that each of the virtues is sensitive to the operation oftbe others, and 
reacts reciprocally to them. Honesty, for example, is merely brutal 
candor unless it is sensitive to circumstance, and coordinated with 
kindness and tact as well as with fidelity (consider testimony given 
under oath), and with justice (consider cases in which telling the truth 
will cause the wicked to prosper), and on and on. 
Such reflection reinforces the contention that an ununified bundle of 
virtues account is theoretically insupportable. and that some theory of 
organic unity will best reflect both the diversity we see in the virtues and 
the dynamic process of adjustment they appear to go through with 
respect to each other. But it also reinforces the desirability of finding a 
fairly simple regulative principle at the bottom of all of this. If we 
cannot do that, but instead must pick apart each oftbe virtues to find its 
own regulative principles, we will have a very long project. (An 
indefinitely long one, in fact, since there seems to be no limit, in 
principle, to the various ways of cutting up ideal character into separate 
virtues.) 
I believe, however, that this approach to organic unity, long or short, 
should be abandoned. Or rather, I believe that when pursued, it will 
inevitably collapse into either an unappealing argument for the identity 
of the virtues or an argument for their ordinal unity. My reasons are 
these: 
Think about conflicts, and the way a regulative principle would have 
to work to insure that the virtue of honesty, say, was always compatible 
with prudence,justice, kindness, loyalty and the rest. (I) It could work 
by dissolving connicts as they arise (as oposed to settling them); by 
modulating each virtue until it fits with the other, similarly modulated 
oncs. This sort of conflict resolution is essentially the process of turning 
down the contrast between conflicting elements. That is an instructive 
metaphor, in fact, because the limiting result of turning down the 
contrast is a blank screen: identity; a perfectly seamless whole in which 
there are no contrasting elements at all. 10 And this seems to be what 
happens to the separate virtues (on some accounts) when we press 
persistently for the dissolution of conflicts between them; they dissolve 
into one another - into one featureless thing called virtue. Honesty 
isn't simply the disposition to tell the truth, then. Rather, it is essentially 
a certain region of an otherwise undifferentiated form of wisdom, or 
knowledge, or ideal character - the region that concerns truthtelling. 
And the same, mUlatis mutandis, then happens to every other virtue. 
Each is dissolved into an account of the same one thing. When this 
happens, the notion of organic unity collapses by stages into identity. 
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(2) The other way a regulative principle could work is by avoiding 
conflicts as they arise - by slopping each disposition short of conflict, 
leaving the contrast between them intact. Now if each of the virtues has 
this sort of collision avoidance system, and nothing else, we will instantly 
get a four-way stop problem: each stops short of collision, and then no 
one makes the first move. The obvious solution to such deadlocks is to 
have some right-of-way rules - some priority rules - about who goes 
first. But when those sorts of rules are added, this account of organic 
unity has collapsed into ordinal unity. That is, at this point we have 
view of the virtues that holds them to be a heterogeneous but ordered 
unity. 
One further remark about all these organic views of unity: It seems to 
me that none of them can do anything to help resolve the coincidence 
problems - without, again, collapsing into either an identity view or an 
ordinal one. Organic unity is, after all, a thesis about the harmony ofthe 
virtues - about the absence of conflict between them. It is not a thesis 
about what is to be done about conflict-free cases in which we want a 
particular virtue to be the leading one. If the virtues are not distinct 
enough to admit this problem, then we have gone back to an identity 
doctrine. If they are distinct enough to admit it, then no matter how 
good an account of organic unity we have, we will need an ordinal one 
in addition. 
ORDINAL UNITY 
It thus seems reasonable to move away from an organic conception of 
the virtues, except insofar as it can be incorporated into an ordinal one. 
What I want to do in this final portion of the paper is show which sort of 
ordinal account is most promising. ' 
Types of Ordinal Accounts 
Unique ordering. There are at least three ways to get a completely 
ordered set of the virtues. One is astrict numerical order in which each 
virtue has a unique ordinal status: There is exactly one virtue in first 
place, exactly one other virtue in second, and so on. There are not ties 
for nth place. The first virtue then dominates all the rest, the second 
dominates all but the first, etc. Since every conflict or coincidence 
necessarily pits a higher against a lower virtue, every case will be 
decidable. The first virtue will be the controlling one whenever it 
conflicts or coincides with anything below it; the second will be 
controlling only in cases when the first virtue is indifferent to it (that is, 
neither conflicts nor coincides with it); and so on down the line. The 
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only way that a Little trait like tact will ever be expressed, then, is when 
all the traits above it are indifferent to it and. so to speak, pass it 
through. The proposal I will sketch below involves arguing for a unique 
first virtue. But the idea that we might be able to justify a unique 
ordering all the way from first to last seems too improbable to pursue. 
Branching structures. That leaves two other possibilities. One is a 
pyramidal or downwardly branching structure in which two or morc 
secondary virtues are dominated by the first, each secondary virtue 
dominates its own set of tertiary ones, and so forth. 
VI 
·0 
I 
V2(a) V2(b) V2(c) 
I I I I I I I I V3(a) .................................................... ............................ .. .......... V3(z) 
........ .. ........ etc. 
I 
etc. 
The difficulty here is obviously that conflicts and coincidences between 
secondary virtues or between any others at the same ordinal level , might 
proliferate. For conflicts, we might try (!) to argue for the additivity of 
virtues (that is, for the thesis that the virtuous act is whatever is 
recommended by the greater number of traits on a given level), and then 
put up with the few remaining ties. But notice that this does nOlhing to 
resolve coincidence problems. And the prospect of trying to arrange an 
intricate branching structure in which no such problems could arise is a 
baffling one. So I put this aside as well, except to note that my proposal 
below will involve a very simple, two-level branching structure. 
Decision procedures. The remaining alternative is to try to find a 
decision procedure - a set of considerations that will decide any 
conflict or coincidence that arises, not in terms of a rigid, fixed, overall 
ordinal structure but rather in terms of a method for coming to 
conclusions. This, it seems to me, is the only hope (faint as it may be) for 
resolving priority problems for the virtues. 
The idea of adecision procedure in this context is simply this: there is 
a decision procedure for a given conflict or coincidence if and only if 
there is a series of deliberative steps which will necessarily identify one 
virtue as the one that ought to be dominant in that case. The virtues are 
completely ordered by such a procedure if it will decide any arbitrarily 
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selected conflict or coincidence. Of course it would be a trivial and 
pointless exercise to construct either an arbitrary procedure (like a coin 
flip), or onc contrived to yield predetermined results (like an algorithm 
for generating a predetermined unique ordering). And it would be vain 
to expect the procedure to be a "clerical routine" that CQuld be applied 
mechanically to a problem, or that would reach a definitive rather than 
a provisional conclusion. Those expectations 3rc appropriate to 
mathematics but not to ethics. What is appropriate to ethics is rather a 
procedure which (I) is controlled by ordering principles constructed 
from reasoned moral deliberation about the proper ordinal relationships 
between various subsets of the virtues, (2) is applicable to all ordinal 
questions about the virtues(i.e., is complete), and (3) has a non-arbitrary 
mechanism for getting provisional closure on such questions when the 
ordering principles are inconclusive. I I 
PRACTICAL WISDOM AS A CONTROLLING VIRTUE 
The foregoing analysis suggests a way in which practical wisdom, in the 
Aristotelian sense, could provide the necessary unity for the virtues -
and a type of ordinal unity that resolves both conflict and coincidence 
problems. Accounts or organic unity have often made practical wisdom 
the central element. Since I believe the idea of organic unity should be 
abandoned here, I reject those accounts. But I think the Aristotelian 
conception of practical wisdom fits very well into an ordinal scheme. 12 
What I have in mind borrows a good deal from three notions involved 
in the accounts previously discussed: One is the concept of a central, 
regulative virtue. Another is the idea of a downwardly branching 
ordinal structure - a very flat one in this case, with the controlling or 
regulative virtue as the only one of the first order, and all the other 
virtues as second-order ones. And the third notion is that of a decision 
procedure - that is, a process through which any given conflict or 
coincidence wil1 be resolved. This idea may be represented as a two-level 
branching structure: 
controlling virtue 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
VI ... V2 ........................................................................................... Vn 
What these three notions suggest is the following possibility. 
Suppose we think of practical wisdom (phronesis) as the trait that 
controls all the others, at every moment of reflective conduct. At the 
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moment of choice, its function is to elicit the appropriate act and 
motivation by invoking the appropriate second-order virtue (prudence, 
benevolence or whatever). And as long as only one trait is invoked, 
there will be no conflict or coincidence problems here. Reflective choice, 
for the virtuous person, is a univalent response. That is practical 
wisdom at the moment of choice. 
In deliberation, the function of practical wisdom is to order the whole 
range of possibilities for conduct in such a way that the appropriate act 
and motivation will stand out as such, and as constitutive of a particular 
virtue - the virtue that will be the dominant one in that context. Again, 
as long as only one trait is selected, there will be no conflict or 
coincidence problems here. Deliberation, for the virtuous person, ends 
in a univalent response. That is practical wisdom in deliberation. 
And finally, for the full-scale rational assessment of conduct (either 
retrospective or hypothetical), the function of practical wisdom is to 
produce a coherent, context-sensitive general picture of the 
appropriateness of various acts and motives, as constitutive of various 
virtues. Conflict and coincidence problems will be avoided here as long 
as all other virtues are subordinate to practical wisdom, and none of 
them has priority over any other. 
This conception of practical wisdom is of a purely instrumental 
virtue - one completely empty of its own ends, as it were, except the 
instrumental one of finding the means to the various ends given to it in 
situations of choice, deliberation, or rational assessment. Practical 
wisdom must handle every given end impartially, on (initially) equal 
terms. In itself. then, it is thus neither egoistic or altruistic, competitive 
or cooperative, benevolent or miserly, merciful or just. 
Now the plausibility of this sort of solution to the priority problem -
this controlling virtue version of an ordinal account of the unity of the 
virtues - rests squarely on the possibility of describing and justifying a 
decision procedure (as a part of practical wisdom) that will 
nonarbitrarily select one and only one trait in any given choice or 
deliberative situation. And that seems to me to be a much less daunting 
task than that of getting a unique and complete ordering, or a long 
branching structure. 
In general terms, what we need to do is describe a way to find , in a 
given situation, what counts as the appropriate trait to invoke. And 
there is a familiar description we can give. A highly compressed sketch 
of it would go something like this. 
A trait is the appropriate one for a given situation if that trait is the 
one best suited (instrumentally) 
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selected conflict or coincidence. Of course it would be a trivial and 
pointless exercise to construct either an arbitrary procedure (like acoin 
flip), or one contrived to yield predetermined results (like an algorithm 
for generating a predetermined unique ordering). And it would be vain 
to expect the procedure to be a "clerical routine" that could be applied 
mechanically to a problem, or that would reach a definitive rather than 
a provisional conclusion. Those expectations are appropriate to 
mathematics but not to ethics. What is appropriate to ethics is rather a 
procedure which (I) is controlled by ordering principles constructed 
from reasoned moral deliberation about the proper ordinal relationships 
between various subsets of the virtues, (2) is applicable to all ordinal 
questions about the virtues (i.e., is complete), and (3) has a non-arbitrary 
mechanism for getting provisional closure on such questions when the 
ordering principles are inconciusive. 1I 
PRACTICAL WISDOM AS A CONTROLLING VIRTUE 
The foregoing analysis suggests a way in which practical wisdom, in the 
Aristotelian sense, could provide the necessary unity for the virtues -
and a type of ordinal unity that resolves both conflict and coincidence 
problems. Accounts or organic unity have often made practical wisdom 
the central element. Since I believe the idea of organic unity should be 
abandoned here, I reject those accounts. But I think the Aristotelian 
conception of practical wisdom fits very well into an ordinal scheme. 12 
What I have in mind borrows a good deal from three notions involved 
in the accounts previously discussed: One is the concept of a central, 
regulative virtue. Another is the idea of a downwardly branching 
ordinal structure - a very flat one in this case, with the controlling or 
regulative virtue as the only one of the first order, and all the other 
virtues as second-order ones. And the third notion is that of a decision 
procedure - that is , a process through which any given conflict or 
coincidence will be resolved. This idea may be represented as a two-level 
branching structure: 
controlling virtue 
I I I I I I I I I 
VI.. .V2. ............. ..... ..... ........................................ , .. .............. Vn 
What these three notions suggest is the following possibility. 
Suppose we think of practical wisdom (phronesis) as the trait that 
controls all the others, at every moment of reflective conduct. At the 
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(a) to elicit the conduct which will achieve the greatest sum of 
one's immediate ends, 
(b) assessed in terms of their compatibility with and effectiveness 
as means for achieving the greatest sum of one's intermediate 
ends, 
(c) assessed in terms of their compatibility with and effectiveness 
as means for achieving the greatest sum of one's ultimate 
ends, 
(d) assessed in terms of their compability with and effectiveness 
in sustaining social relationships and associations, 
(e) assessed in terms of their ability to engender and sustain the 
satisfaction of (al the sorts of immediate ends characteristic 
of people whose actual immediate ends are appropriate, given 
existing conditions, for (b') those intermediate ends 
appropriate for ... etc. 
This spiral process becomes, with each successive round, increasingly 
general - increasingly centered on the traits that can enrich any 
person's life, taken as a whole and considered in its circumstances. Yet 
the process never loses its rootedness in individual interest, or covertly 
imposes an end other than that of practical wisdom. This confirms the 
claim that we are dealing with a genuine decision procedure here, rather 
than a disguised substantive principle; and it helps to clarify the way in 
which such a procedure could be at once empty of its own ends and of 
use in unifying the virtues. 
The familiarity of this process does not show, of course, that we will 
be able to get an adequate ordinal account of the unity of the virtues 
with it. But it does give some hope. The hope comes from three sources. 
First , as described, practical wisdom relies solely on instrumental 
reaoning, which we understand as well or better than any kind of 
reasoning we do. Second, there are familiar procedures for getting 
closure, for practical purposes, in such reasoning when it is inconclusive. 
And third, the notion that instrumental rationality must ultimately 
dominate all other traits is situated firmly in a long tradition of 
productive moral theorizing, from Plato onward. 
It is worth pausing, here, to note two things: First, the dominance of 
the trait of practical wisdom does not entail the intrusive or pervasive 
use of instrumental reasoning in everyday life. Fluency in a language 
means having a good enough sense of the language - a good enough 
eye and ear for it - that grammatical analysis is seldom necessary. 
Likewise, practical wisdom seldom requires detailed instrumental 
139 
LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
reasoning. Second, since practical wisdom is empty of its own 
substantive ends, and is obviously sensitive to circumstance, it can unify 
a wide range of character types. It is thus compatible with liberal ideals. 
Whether the dominance of practical wisdom will also do more 
substantive work for virtue theory, by somehow ruling out the standard 
types of vicious character, is a subject for another essay. Here my aims 
were simply to argue that the account of the unity of the virtues should 
be an ordinal one, and that the ordinal account should be a two-tiered 
decision procedure with practical wisdom as the only first-order trait. 
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NOTES 
• Earlier versions of this paper were discussed in the Faculty Writing Workshop 
and the Senior Seminar in Philosophy at Hollins College. I am grateful to the 
members of those groups, as well as to the Editor of this journal, for many useful 
comments. Nickolas Pappas, in particular, urged me to emphasize the problem 
of overlapping or coincident virtues, and to be less hasty in dismissing a two-tiered 
ordering. Alvord Beardslee had earlier provided important bibliographicadvice. 
For a sketch of the complex early Western history of the unity-of-the-virtues 
debate, see James J. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection ofthe Virtues," Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 24 (1986): 453-482, at 454-458. And for illuminating 
work on the way the problem arises in Confucian ethics, see Antonio S. Cua, 
"Hsiln Tzu and the Unity of Virtues," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14 (1987): 
381 - 400. 
2 For illuminating defenses of the plausibility of Socrates' commitment to tbe 
identity view in the Protagoras (at 329 ff) and some other dialogues, see Terry 
Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," The Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 35-68, and 
Michael T. Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of Socratic Inquiry," 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 20(1982): 1-22. Both take the position (for 
somewhat different reasons) that Socrates could plausibly have been asserting 
the identity of the virtues with a common "state of the soul" which produces or 
grounds them all. And if two or more things are all identical with the same further 
thing, they are identical with each other as well. For a careful statement of the 
view most commentators have held - that Socrates could have been asserting 
only an equivalence relation rather tban identity - see Gregory Vlastos, "The 
Unity of the Virtues," Platonic Studies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1973), pp. 221-269. It should also be remarked that one can find denials of both 
the identity and equivalence views in a number of Plato's dialogues. Penner 
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asserts this ab.>ut Euthyphro. Mena, and EUlhydemus, and notes that in 
Statesman 305-308, it is argued that conflicts between the virtues are possible. 
3 This seems to have been Aristotle's view, in the sense that he held the virtues to be 
generated and united by a kind of practical intelligence or wisdom (phronesis). 
See Nicomachean Ethics I 144b38-1145a2, where he says that while it is possible 
to have some and not others of the "natura'" virtues, this is not possible for the 
"virtues that someone must have to be called unconditionally good; for as soon as 
he has intelligence, which is a single state, he has all the virtues as well." This is 
Terence Irwin's translation (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1985). 
The term that Irwin translates here with the word intelligence isphronesis, which 
is more commonly translated now as practical wisdom. It is roughly equivalent to 
the Latin prudenlia and has therefore sometimes been translated (misleadingly 
for modern eyes) as prudence. In any case, as Irwin points out on p. 412, Aristotle 
claims that phronesis "is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of complete 
VIRTUE of character (1107al. 1138b I 8-34, II44bI4-1I45a, 1178aI6- 19) .... 
[and that becausephronesis] is practical, someone cannOI both have it and fail to 
act correctly ... (1145a4-9, 1152a6-14)." Given the enthusiasm with which 
commentators have taken up the challenge of explaining how it might be that this 
one trait could entail all the rest , and given the potential for misunderstanding 
Aristotle on this point, Ross's choice in the Oxford edition of Aristotle(preserved 
by Urmson in the 1984 revised edition, and used by Ostwald as well) seems the 
best one: they all translatephronesis as practical wisdom. Early Christian thinkers 
revised not only the list of virtues but the account of their organic unity. St. 
Jerome apparently endorsed the view that he who has one virtue has them all, but 
others followed St. Augustine in rejecting that idea. See Augustine's 0" the 
Morals a/the Catholic Church, Chapter XV, where the four fundamental virtues 
(temperance, courage or fortitude, justice, and prudence) are all considered as 
differing forms of the perfect love of God. 
For some later medieval developments, see Walsh, op. cit. 
4 Pluralism, in this context, either in the form of cheerful liberalism or in the form 
of a tragic view of life, is not a solution to the problem I am discussing, but rather 
the rejection of it. Pluralism is the acceptance of an account in which there are 
genuinely conflicting, equally fundamental virtues. And of course the various 
skeptical arguments that make so much ofthe significance of moral dilemmas are 
committed to saying that this problem about the virtues cannot legitimately be 
either solved or rejected. 
s Walsh ,op.cit. 
6 Ferejohn, op. cit. 
7 Some attempts to solve prisoner's dilemmas and free rider problems take a 
similar line. See Lawrence C. Becker, "The Free Rider Problem," in Harlan 
Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), The limits 0/ U/iJitarianism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), and David Gauthier, Morals byAgreemem 
(Oxford: Oxford University press, 1985). More generally, utilitarians have 
occasionally made arguments about the utility of developing certain traits that 
short-circuit the practice of making decisions based on the utilitarian principle. 
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And my argument in Reciprocily( Boston: Routledge & Kegan Pau~ 1986), while 
not utilitarian, certainly argues for the cultivation of a disposition to reciprocate 
that preempts rational self-maximizing behavior in many circumstances. 
8 See Gary Watson , "Virtues in Excess," Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 57-74 
for an illuminating review of these matters. 
9 Moderation is not the only candidate for a regulative principle. See Walsh, op. 
cit., pp. 455- 456. 
In the earlier(medieval] period, the major concern was for the relation orthe 
virtues divinely infused through grace with the naturally acquired virtues. A 
common doctrine was that the infused virtue of charity drives out the vices 
and serves as the cause or from of all the virtues, thus uniting them. 
Occasionally the four cardinal virtues were trealed as infused ... A consequence 
of Ihese views is that the acquired virtues, considered in themselves , are not 
connected, so that for them it is not true that he who has one must have them 
aiL .. (455) 
He goes on. however, to illustrate the tendency to slip back into an equivalence 
account. 
This independence of the acquired virtues was sometimes significantly 
qualified by the claim that the exercise of any virtue ought to be made with 
moderation , forcefulness, insight and adaption to the end, and thus 
temperately, courageously, prudently, and justly. This positing of a set of 
general cardinal conditions was taken 10 show the way that virtues can be 
connected, but it bequeathed the problem of clearly distinguishing between 
those general conditions and the associated virtues ... 
[Thomas Aquinas] Following Aristotle closely.. distinguished between 
natural propensities and developed virtuous habits. The propensities are not 
necessarily connected. The habits develop through interaction with prudence, 
and since prudence has a single ultimate end, the moral virtues are connected 
through it. (455-456) 
10 Consider this passage from John Buridan's Questiones ..... translated by James J . 
Walsh and printed in "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," op . cit., p. 480: 
Therefore it seems to me that each of these habits is perfected through its 
connection with the other, and that one virtue, perfectly prepared for by 
acting well is constituted from them. For I think that the second habit. other 
things being equal, is stronger in one who has the first habit than in one who 
lacks it. II also seems 10 me that virtue complete in this way is single in species, 
or even numerically ... (480) 
II A procedure such as this may (or may not) produce an invariant ordering of the 
virtues. If it does, it will have the same practical result as a substantive principle 
for achieving ordinal unity. But "strictly speaking." as Asa Kasher has pointed 
out to me in correspondence, it will not yield "an ordinal s truc{Ure in the class of 
virtues, but rather in the class of instances of application of virtues 
considerations." This may lead one to suspect the existence of an underlying, 
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subtanti ve element in the procedu re, itself describable as a vi rtue. The acco unt of 
pract ical wisdom introduced below is meant to deal with that suspicion . 
12 Asa Kasher has brought to my attention a book by Troels Engberg- Pedersen, 
Aristotle's Theory of Mora/ Insight (Oxford : Clarend on Press, 1983), which 
bea rs on the material in th is section of my paper. Engberg- Pederson argues 
(Chapter 6) that phronesis, fo r Aristotle, is a so rt of "cognitive grasp" of or 
" moral insight" into pract ical si lUations defi ned (in part) by desi res th at a re 
indepe ndent of it. 
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